There has been some resistance to directive language in top-level security documents, avoiding terms like “must” for what are perfectly reasonable expectations. Instead, organisations are choosing looser language in deference to local leaders … and possibly as a buffer for liability.
Sometimes it goes further, and the document itself stops being a “policy” and becomes a “framework”. That’s like swapping wedding vows for “guiding principles for the relationship”. It sounds open, flexible and very modern, right up until there’s friction and the lawyers are sitting across a table working out who gets the assets.
A policy states what the organisation requires of itself and its people, so there is something to be measured against, whereas a framework describes how things are organised and leaves the obligation open to interpretation.
After an incident, the question is always the same: what standard of care did you set for yourself, and did you meet it? A board-approved policy answers that cleanly, while a framework turns it into an argument about what you meant. If the governing document doesn’t make clear who owns security or what was required, a plaintiff’s lawyer doesn’t need to prove the organisation fell short of its standard; they can argue it never set one.
In the US, negligent-security claims turn on whether the measures were reasonable, and a clear policy is the simplest way to show what “reasonable” looked like. In the UK, the test is whether arrangements were adequate and whether anyone actually owned them, which is hard to demonstrate when the top document doesn’t oblige anyone to do anything.
Flexibility is what the framework label sells, and it’s the last thing you want to be defending before a regulator, or investigators who work for plaintiffs. Protecting people and assets is one area where “must” is exactly the right word.


